Wednesday, November 12, 2008

Exit Iraq: Sociometric Considerations

Sociometric considerations of the Mesopotamian Basin: Did we engage the process on any meaningful level prior to entering Iraq? Not likely. But then again, we are Americans. Our own national history is abbreviated compared with much of the world. We are culturally engineered for an instant society whether using a drive-thru banking line or demanding pizza delivery in thirty minutes or less.

Militarily, contingencies exist for all scenarios from the mother of all terrors which would be a nuclear attack practically down to Farmer Brown stealing Grandma Jones’ rifle stash from the shed. Well, possibly not to that level.... but you get the point. Break-out plans can unfold in seconds and not hours, in a state of emergency. The lessons learned from 9/11 certainly brought us to the top of our game.

We entered Iraq and the military plan was executed rapidly and with efficiency. Tactical brilliance with near flawless execution was our portion for two weeks. But dull-witted, the overly confident analyst' community assumption this venture would be similar to Gulf I with ease of mission completion. They blew their chance for "greatness". The physical topography was adequately considered by the military. But the sociocultural terrain of mind was the missing piece from the chessboard and the analysts are to blame.

Entering Iraq did not change the people. It merely dissected the political landscape. The Iraqi people are predominantly Muslims. Their system of life is Islam and not Western democracy. We deposed a dictator, put in place a new Constitution and changed the power structure. We dabbled with Chalabi and Alawi and quicker than you can say “toppled statue” a new field of interested players also appeared on the geopolitical chessboard. We disbanded the Baath party structure, Sunni minority handed the political reins over to a Shi’a majority, and in quick succession agents in search of a proxy state crossed over from Iran to Iraq. The Chinese and Russians also warmed their hands to the opening possibilities of a post-dictatorial Iraq. Shi’a Muslims from Iran trudged to Karbala to purchase real estate near a revered holy shrine and the real estate market was good. Sunni tribal sheikh looked on whilst consulting with their faithful. Saddam Hussein hid in his hole and other rats vacated their tunnels.

Our troops became both magnet and shield. Their presence drew many al-Qaedah fighters to the region and in the world of big game hunting our military has bagged more than a few of the biggest players. One thing cannot be denied. We have not suffered a significant attack on our soil since 9/11. I respect our Commander in Chief for that one reason, if none other. Thank God for a man with backbone. Immense respect, for our troops and their sacrifices. Minimal regard, for the opaque line of thinking from the camp of the analysts.

We now work on many levels to rectify our deficits in cultural intelligence. But the legacy remains: Sociometric signals from the region were not well-understood and the law of unintended consequences came into play. Our lack of depth of understanding in how the human tectonic plates would begin to move when we entered Iraq still plague us today. A muslim, is a muslim, is a muslim! So went the reasoning of the day. But the subtle differences between Sunni and Shi’a, perceptible on the surface, are difficult enough to understand. And geographically, Iraq presents a special case because of the history of modern dominance of a Sunni minority over Shi’a majority in this region. In democratic manner, we handed the power back to the majority.

I predict that when we leave Iraq a bit of additional bloodshed will be the portion of the Sunni. Just as surely as the Shi’a stepped over the dead bodies of their own under the brutality of Saddam Hussein’s regime, they will require the Sunni to perform the same sad dance to greater extent when we leave. Revenge is never an issue of expediency in the Middle East and transgressions against tribe, clan or family are never forgotten. The task may fall to the tenth generation of the slain, but all in its own good time. The blood of a hundred camels, and then some....

Toss in the shadow dancers awaiting opportunity in a post-American presence and our newly elected president and counsel will have a difficult task. It will remain to be seen if a popular campaign promise becomes a reality by summer of 2010. Tomorrow, let’s examine the sociometric badges of the shadow dancers. We will begin with the Ayatollah chain of command and work our way to the borders and beyond.

Tammy Swofford